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Resolution of the Ethics Committee
Resolution of the Ethics Committee
Resolution of the Ethics Committee | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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In accordance with the provisions of article 24 of the Rules
of Ethics, the Ethics Committee resolved as follows:
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“A Member of the Knesset, who refers an issue for any
sort of examination or investigation (to the State Comptroller, Attorney
General, Police etc.), shall not publish the content of the petition, as long as
he has not submitted a copy thereof to that person and gave him a reasonable
opportunity to react”.
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In accordance with the provisions of articles 22 and 24 of the
Rules of Ethics, the Ethics Committee decides as follows:
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“Should a Member of the Knesset publish in the media
some damaging publication against another Member, and should he turn to the
Ethics Committee regarding the same issue, the Ethics Committee is entitled not
to deliberate his complaint”.
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1.
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a.
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Article 13a(a) of the Knesset Members’ Immunity, Rights
and Duties Law, 1951 (hereafter - the Immunity Law), prohibits the Knesset
Member to engage in any business or in any additional occupation, except for a
voluntary occupation, and without reward.
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b.6
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Article 13a(b) of the Immunity Law prohibits the Knesset
Member to engage in any additional occupation, even without reward, if this
occupation includes one of the following:
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(1)
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...
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(2)
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The suspicion of abuse or attaining any advantage or personal
preference, due to his being a Member of the Knesset;
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(3)
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The possibility of a conflict of interests between the
additional occupation and his position as a Member of the Knesset.
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2.
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Recently reservations have been raised before the Ethics
Committee regarding the service of several Members of the Knesset in public
institutions and bodies, with the claim of the existence of a danger of the
attainment of an advantage or a preference by those bodies, as well as the
prospect of a conflict of interests. In face of these arguments, the Ethics
Committee reexamined the issue.
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3.
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a.
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Article 14a of the Immunity Law lays down that “a Member
of the Knesset shall not serve in an administrative position, whether paid or
unpaid, in an institution, in a company, in an association, or in any other body
that receives, whether directly or indirectly, a special financial allocation.
“Special financial allocation” is defined as “an allocation
for a body that is not a state institution, that is mentioned by name in the
budget law, and constitutes over one quarter of the budget of that
body.”
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b.
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The aforementioned article 14a, was legislated when the system
of distributing support by means of what was referred to as “earmarked
funds” existed. This system vanished from the world upon the legislation
of article 3a of the Foundations of the Budget Law, 1985, that lays down that
support of public institutions shall be determined in every budget article, with
a comprehensive sum for each type of public institution, and this sum shall be
distributed among public institutions belonging to that category, on the basis
of egalitarian criteria. The above article 3a also laid down that the official
responsible for the budget, shall lay down, in consultation with the Attorney
General, egalitarian criteria for the distribution of the sum that was decided
upon in that budget article, for the purpose of support of public institutions.
As to requests by public institutions to receive support, article 3a laid down
that the Finance Minister shall decide, in consultation with the Attorney
General, a procedure by which such requests shall be submitted and dealt with.
And finally: both the procedure and the criteria shall be published in the
official gazette, so that they shall be visible to everyone, and known to
everyone.
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4.
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On the basis of everything said, the Ethics Committee felt,
that there is no reason why Members of the Knesset should not serve voluntarily,
and without return, in administrative roles in public institutions and bodies,
and it even gave its approval to this. It does not appear that a danger exists
of attaining a personal advantage or preference, and also the possibility of a
conflict of interests appears unlikely, given the fact that the attention of the
Knesset Members concerned was drawn to the limitations set in the said article
13a(b).
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5.
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As stated, the Committee was requested to review the issue
afresh. The Committee did so, and adopted the following resolutions:
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a.
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There is no objection to Members of the Knesset serving in
administrative positions in public institutions and bodies, voluntarily and
without return, even if these bodies and institutions receive support from the
state budget, or from the budget of any government authority.
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b.
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In order that there should be no appearance of a prospect of a
conflict of interests, and in order to prevent any malicious talk, the Committee
lays down that from now on a Member of the Knesset shall not engage, within the
framework of his voluntary work in a public body or institution, in appearance,
representation, carrying out of negotiations or lobbying activities, whether
orally or in writing, before a government authority.
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c.
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For this purpose “government authority” - one of
the state authorities, a local authority, a legal authority, as well as a state
association or institution.
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d.
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The beginning of the application of this resolution, is from
the day on which it was laid on the Knesset’s table,
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6.
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It did not escape the eyes of the Committee that a Member of
the Knesset, who does not serve in a public body or institution, is also liable,
by means of his activities in the Knesset Committees and outside of them, to
obtain budgets and other assistance for a body, whose goals he wishes to
further. At the same time, it appears to the Committee that there is no reason
to prohibit these Knesset Members approaching government factors, to obtain
assistance for bodies that, in their opinion, are worthy of it. The application
of the decision on Members of the Knesset who fill positions in public bodies or
institutions comes - as stated above - in order that there should be no
appearance of the body managed, or headed by the Knesset Member, receiving more
than a similar body, that does not have the privilege of a Knesset Member being
a member of its management.
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A Member of the Knesset occasionally requires, like every
human being, financial assistance, for the financing of his legal defence, or
for receiving expensive medical care, that he or members of his family require.
On the one hand there is the argument, that the Knesset Member should not
exploit his status in order to obtain any sort of contributions, but - on the
other hand - why should this detract from the position of the Knesset Member
compared that of any person who gets into trouble and requires assistance? This
resolution assumes that it is not possible to disregard a reality that forces a
Member of the Knesset as well to require, under certain circumstances,
contributions, and at the same time it comes to delimit and guide the Knesset
Members on this issue, so that Heaven forbid, they should not err.
The resolution does not deal with the receipt of contributions
for the purpose of the current activity of the Knesset Member, or to promote his
candidacy for various positions, a subject, which is partially dealt with in the
Parties Law. The decision also does not presume to replace the Penal Code
relating to the prohibition on the receipt of bribery, or instead of the
provisions of the Public Service Law (presents), that regulate the issue of the
receipt of presents by a public employee “as a public employee”.
The breach of these provisions is a matter for the Attorney General to deal
with, not for the Knesset. This resolution relates only to the ethical question
of the receipt of such contributions by a Member of the Knesset, and this under
the assumption that the receipt of such contributions, for the financing of the
defence in a criminal trial, or for attaining medical treatment, does not
constitute, under its circumstances, an offence against the provisions of any
law.
Whenever the word “contributions” will be
mentioned heretofore, the allusion will be only to contributions for the
purpose of financing legal defence, or medical treatment.
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We do not seek to prohibit a Member of the Knesset to receive
contributions in a direct manner, but we are of the opinion that the proper way
to collect contributions is by means of an association, that will be set up
under the Associations Law, and the Knesset Member himself shall not be a member
thereof. It is the association that shall engage in the task of collecting
contributions, and everything connected therewith, and it shall pay the legal
defence expenses or the medical treatment expenses. We should note that the
Committee has already dealt with this issue in the past, and the main points
were laid down in the 12th Knesset.
The association shall act under the following rules:
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(1)
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Fund-raising stalls should not be set up, and fund-raisers
should not be sent to homes, unless a bank account or accounts are opened, to
which the contributors will be asked to send their contributions;
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(2)
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The appeal to contributors shall be done by means of notices
in the press, or personal letters.
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(3)
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When the required contribution is for the purpose of financing
legal defence, there shall be nothing in the wording of the appeals to the
contributors to tarnish State authorities, nor shall intentions of persecution
against a Knesset Member, or similar accusations be attributed to
them.
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(4)
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The association shall announce in advance, that upon the
termination of the legal proceedings it shall disband itself, and the remainder
of the funds - if such will remain - shall be handed over for some public goal
that shall be indicated. Once the association shall disband itself, it shall
published a report to that effect in the press.
As to the Knesset Member himself, he must avoid receiving any
sort of contribution, whether directly or by means of the association, with
regards to which there is any sort of suspicion that it might involve a conflict
of interests. In addition, the Knesset Member must follow the list of
contributors and the level of the contributions, and in so far as necessary,
request the return of contributions, that do not correspond to the criteria
mentioned above, to the contributors.
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1.
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Following publications regarding Members of the Knesset
joining the trips of Ministers going abroad, on 12.5.1998 the Speaker approached
the Ethics Committee, and requested that it deliberate this issue, and instruct
the Knesset Members accordingly.
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2.
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Already on 21.7.1993, the Ethics Committee decided that
appointments of Knesset Members by the Government, or by one of its Ministers to
various positions, creates the possibility of a conflict of interests, a
derogation to the principle of the separation of powers, the danger of damage to
the independence of the Knesset Members, the danger of the involvement of
foreign considerations in the supervisory tasks assigned to them, and a
derogation to the image of the Knesset as a body whose role is to criticize the
Government. Therefore, the Committee decided, that a member of the Knesset
shall not receive a Government appointment, unless the Ethics Committee
considers there to be special reason to approve such an appointment.
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3.
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The Ethics Committee decided that the joining by a Member of
the Knesset of a Minister traveling abroad, is like a temporary appointment to
the position of a member of the Minister’s entourage, and therefore
requires the approval of the Committee.
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4.
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A Minister who wishes a Member of the Knesset to join him on
his trip, shall approach the Ethics Committee in writing, and shall explain his
request.
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A trip on a mission of the “Bonds” cannot be
considered a trip on behalf of the Knesset. The “Bonds” can be
assisted by (at least) tens of former Members of the Knesset, as well as Members
of the Knesset during Knesset recesses, and these are not events at which the
Knesset considers it its duty to be represented, also in the course of the
Knesset’s sessions.
1
Adopted on 28.5.1986, in accordance with the instructions
of article 24 of the Rules of Ethics for Members of the
Knesset.
Articles 2 and 3 were replaced on
25.11.1986.
2
Adopted on 21.7.1993
3
Adopted on 2.3.1988, and amended on
27.5.1997
4
Adopted on 28.3.1995
5
Adopted on 10.12.1996
6
Within the limitations set in the Immunity Law, and the decision of
the Ethics Committee, the danger of the Knesset Member
acting in his position (in a public body), with a
likely and real prospect of a conflict of interests between his position and his
duty of allegiance as a Member of the Knesset, is dismissed (HCJ 9051/96,
Avraham Fried-Pritzi v. Amnon Rubinstein and others).
7
Adopted on 1.7.1997
8
Adopted on 26.5.1998
9
adopted on 7.7.1998
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