Suicide attacks began in the Middle East but have become a problem for the entire western world. If we examine the history of terror, we find that suicide attacks began as early as the 18th century, by Moslems in Asia against western hegemony and colonial rule.

Suicide attacks today, however, have different goals than the early ones. The aim of today's suicide attacks is to cause the greatest possible number of causalities and enormous material damage to order in spread fear and consternation amongst an entire population.

The greater the number of casualties as a consequence of suicide attacks in crowded areas, the greater the media coverage. For that reason suicide attacks are especially attention-grabbing such as the blowing up of an airliner or the use of weapons of mass destruction.

Definition
"A suicide attack is a terrorist act inspired by political-religious motivations and carried out by one or several people who intentionally cause their own deaths along with their targets. The certainty of death of the perpetrator is one of the conditions for the success of the operation."

Are terrorist attacks to be considered "suicide" in the conventional sense of how we understand that term? Western psychiatry defines the prerequisites of the actual suicide to be:
1. Thoughts about killing oneself
2. A realistic plan regarding the steps one must take as well as the right time.
3. Psychological readiness to carry out the plan

In the case of suicide terrorists, the determination to kill the enemy is the dominant motivation. The plan concentrates on killing others while the death of the terrorist is but a secondary consequence. Therefore, it is not considered a suicide in the traditional sense. Furthermore, the suicide is not a cause for shame or suffering for the family. Quite the opposite - the suicide terrorist becomes a "Shahid" (a martyr) and brings great honor and substantial amounts of money to his family, as well as eternal glory for himself.

The "Shahid" and Self Sacrifice
"Shahid" is the Arab word for martyr, and its literal meaning is "witness". This is its meaning in the Koran and is also one of the names of God. Moslem scholars give different explanations as to how this meaning derived from the verb "shahad" (to be a witness, to bear witness). Thus, for example, it is said that the martyr is called a "Shahid" because God and his angels are witnesses that he is worthy of a place in Paradise, or because God will give witness that his intentions were good and pure.

Another interpretation holds that the use of the word "Shahid" to mean martyr is pre-Koran: It is a translation of the Greek word "Martis" and its Syrian counterpart "Sahada" which the early Christians used to indicate the death of the righteous. Whatever the case, the reward of those who have fallen in a campaign for God is described in the Koran quite clearly: "Do not think of those who have fallen for God as dead. They live and are receiving their compensation from their sovereign Lord... for they are not afraid nor are they sorrowful".

The Koran relates to a warrior that has fallen in battle. The expression used in medieval literature to describe these fighters is "Shahadaa Almaracha" - martyrs (that have fallen) in battle. They are also called "martyrs in this world and the world to come". These statements describe the earliest kind of martyrdom in Islam.

During the period of Muhammad, the founder of Islam, five fundamental commandments were constituted. Amongst these were holy war (Jihad), which is obligatory only for those capable of dedicating their lives to it. This concept promises every good thing to those that fall in its pursuit (the "Shahidim"). The believer must be ready to do battle.

Islam viewed signs of soft-heartedness with disdain. There are three main types of fighters: The first does battle without any intention of killing or being killed; the second does battle with the intention of killing the enemy without himself being killed; the third wishes to kill the enemy and be killed himself. The greatest reward is reserved for the third kind of fighter and he will meet Allah and reside anywhere in Paradise he so desires.

No less important than the behavior of the fighters is the reaction of their relatives. Medieval literature contains stories of fathers and mothers who thanked Allah for the fact that their son fell as a "Shahid" and forbade others to mourn for him. In most sources, there is not even a hint that the positive reaction towards the death of a loved one should be accompanied by feelings of sadness and loss.

In order that people be able to overcome their greatest fear - the fear of death - they must believe that their death is worthwhile. This belief is based on the Koran portion cited above. According to this portion the Shahids live. But how are we really meant to understand this text? One interpretation is that the body and soul of the "Shahid" will come back to life during the time of the resurrection of the dead and at that time will receive their reward. The more widespread belief, however, is that the "Shahid" will come back to life immediately after his death. According to one school of thought his body and soul come back to life, while another school of thought maintains that only the soul of the martyr will return to life.

The prophet Muhammad declared that what the "Shahid" gains includes: Forgiveness for his sins, bestowed at the moment that his first drop of blood is spilled, and entry into Paradise immediately upon his death.

The fallen fighter enjoys an extraordinary status not only in the world to come but also in this world in that he benefits from unique interment rituals. In order to be considered a "Shahid" several conditions must be met, the most important of which is intention. He must join battle in true belief. Another condition is that his death will be a direct and immediate result of his injuries.

Death in Battle and Suicide
Islam's attitude towards suicide because of any kind of personal crisis is negative. However, in the Koran the ban on suicide is not definitive and one opinion cites Koran portions that may be interpreted in a way that suicide is permissible under certain conditions.

Moslem scholars have tried to prove that the Koran portion "Do not cast yourselves into perdition" forbids suicide. Yet here again this portion is not necessarily referring to suicide. It appears that in the early stages of Islam suicide was not seen to be a cause for condemnation in every circumstance. However, the ban on suicide is complete and total in several early traditions. Even someone whose death is imminent and wishes to spare himself suffering is not allowed to take his own life (to fall on his sword) or to ask a friend to take his life.

The negative attitude towards suicide changes when we are speaking about "Talab AlShahada" (the desire to die the death of the righteous) on the battlefield. The merits of the "Shahada" in relation to the sanctity of life was debated by scholars of Islamic law in connection to their debates on Holy War ("Jihad"). Some modern Moslem scholars defend those that commit suicide by blowing themselves up by comparing them to the lone warrior of the Middle Ages, as the intention of the suicide bomber is to achieve the death of the righteous. Because it is likely he will inflict damage on the enemy, his action is not only permitted; it is in line with the will of God: it is not self-destruction but rather self-sacrifice and heroism.

Following suicide attacks in the Middle East suggestions were made by a wide range of political and religious personalities, in Israel and in the Arab world, to pressure Moslem religious figures to publish religious proclamations opposing the suicide phenomenon. Several religious figures did indeed respond positively to this call, and published proclamations but not legal religious decisions condemning the phenomenon.

Suicide Attacks in Israel and Lebanon
Suicide attacks began in Israel in 1993, and were carried out by the Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. They drew inspiration from the terror activities of Hizballah in Lebanon against the Americans. In 1983 and 1984 suicide terrorists of the Hizballah twice attacked the American Embassy in Beirut and blew up the Marine barracks at the Beirut airport, killing about 300 people. There were a total of some 50 suicide attacks in Lebanon beginning in 1983. The Palestinians saw that this course of action bought success: The expulsion of the Americans and all western forces from Lebanon. The suicide attacks of the Hizballah against the IDF contributed to the withdrawal of IDF forces from most of Lebanon in 1985 and the unilateral withdrawal from South Lebanon in 2000. It is no surprise, therefore, that when Hamas and the Palestinians recognized the potential of suicide attacks they adopted this course of action.

Since the Oslo Accords, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad have executed suicide attacks in an effort to undermine the feeling of security of the Israeli public and to cause the Middle East Peace Process to fail. The phenomenon increased when the IDF withdrew from Gaza and the West Bank because the intelligence sources from those areas diminished. Terror has increased because now the terrorists have a place to take refuge. The Palestinian Authority functions as a "safe haven" and in breach of its assurances does not prevent terror attacks nor stop suicide bombers. In addition, the Palestinian society encourages and extols suicide terrorists.

The advantages of using suicide tactics - for the terror groups:
1. Maximum casualties and damage
2. A guarantee that the attack will take place exactly at the most suitable time to cause such damage
3. Maximum media coverage
4. It is difficult if not impossible to stop the suicide terrorist and to prevent the attack when he is already on way to his target.
5. There is no need to plan an escape route
6. The terrorist dies and thus there is no way to question him regarding his dispatchers

The advantages of using suicide tactics - for the suicide terrorist:
1. The social status of the "Shahid" and his family increases greatly.
2. In addition to honor, his family receives money - sometimes thousands of dollars.
3. In addition the "Shahid" receives a tremendous personal reward: Eternal life in Paradise, permission to see the face of Allah, and 72 beautiful virgins. He also guarantees eternal life in heaven for 70 of his relatives.

The rewards for the terrorist are, therefore, tremendous in the national, religious, social, economic and personal realms. Subsequently, the Hamas and Islamic Jihad easily find volunteers for suicide activities.

The Ideological Foundation
The ideological foundation for suicide attacks and Islamic terror in general is the doctrine of Jihad. Etymologically, Jihad is meant to indicate an intellectual aspiration to reach a goal. But in Islamic law (the Sharia) the term Jihad has one meaning: Military activity designed to expand the borders of Islamic rule, or to expel infidel trespassers from Islamic territory. This idea is based on the Islamic belief that Islam is not just another Monotheistic religion, but is the ruling belief that has come to replace the others: It is the latest Divine revelation, and thus the most up-to-date.

It is imperative, therefore, that Islam extends its rule over the entire world, by peaceful means if possible, by war if necessary. The obligation to fight wars of Jihad is universal and eternal, until the entire world falls under the sway of Islamic rule. Moslem countries, however, have in practice abandoned this idea, out of various theological and pragmatic considerations. If they hadn't, this idea would have put them in confrontation with the rest of the entire world. Nevertheless, Moslem Fundamentalists have assumed the responsibility of Jihad as a personal/individual responsibility and have dedicated their entire struggle against the infidels in order to fulfill this holy obligation.

The enemies of Fundamentalist Moslem Movements are:

Jewish-Israeli-Zionism - the enemy of Allah and of all humanity in its very essence. As well as being a dagger that the West has stuck in the very heart of the Moslem world.

In order that an enemy becomes a just objective for annihilation, he must be described in the most evil and demonic terms. Thus the caricatures of Jews in the Moslem world reminds one of the anti-Semitic caricatures that appeared in Germany before WWII and justified, as it were, the extermination of the Jews.

The goal of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad is the liberation of Palestine. Their members admit that the real balance of power does not favor the Palestinians. Because of this they say: "Don't prevent us from tilting the balance by sowing destruction and devastation amongst the enemy. This is the importance of suicide missions, which demonstrate that this imbalance of power is not forever, and that we have the option not only to surrender but also to fight".

A formal, legal, religious endorsement, granting sanction and legitimacy to this view in the form of a "Fatwa' (a religious legal decision), has not been given because Islam usually forbids suicide. But one religious cleric, Yusuf Al Kardawi, has published an article that contains a ruling that cannot be misunderstood: "Suicide missions in occupied Palestine represent one of the most excellent expressions of Jihad in the name of Allah... calling such operations suicide attacks is mistaken and misleading. These are operations of self-sacrifice and heroism, and like missions causing the death of the righteous they are completely divorced from the concept of suicide. A person who commits suicide takes his own life. But here we are speaking about a person who kills himself for his religion and his people."

Yusuf Al Kardawi and others justify attacks on civilians that are part of suicide attacks: "Israeli society is a military society. Its men and women are soldiers in its army, and they may be mobilized for army service at a moment's notice."

Following are another two opinions regarding the views presented above:
The view of Professor Abdul Hadi Palazzi, Director of the Institute for Moslem Culture of the Moslem Community of Rome, Italy
This Moslem scholar claims that Fundamentalist Islam has distanced itself from traditional Orthodox Islam and misrepresents the "true" message of Islam. He acknowledges that political commitment is part of the Islamic ethos, but not the Fundamentalist Moslems' refusal to accept countries with a Moslem majority that give non-Moslems equal rights.

According to Palazzi, they confuse the function of religious scholars with that of political leaders. In their opinion Islam is both a religion and a political regime, even though they cannot prove this by way of the religious sources. They are also confused by the concept of Jihad. True Jihad does not demand the use of force to spread the word of Islam, but rather to defend the adherents of Islam from persecution. Jihad has several rules. One of these is that it must be prosecuted by a regular army against another regular army. Thus terrorist activity against a civilian population does not constitute true Jihad. Another condition is that the moment there is a peaceful solution at hand, Moslems are obligated to cease fighting.

Although the Koran praises those who have fallen in the campaign - "Do not think of those who have fallen for God as dead. They live and are receiving their compensation from their sovereign Lord" - it negates suicide. There are passages in the Koran that prove this. Moslem law prohibits suicide, even if done for a good cause.

The Prophet Mohammed, upon returning from a campaign, said: "We are returning from a lesser Jihad to a greater Jihad". What is the greater Jihad? It is the Jihad of the spirit, against the limitations of man himself. But according to Moslem Fundamentalists, the greater Jihad does not exist and they define Jihad solely as war against the enemies of Islam.

Palazzi quotes an Israeli researcher who wrote: "According to the Koran peace between Ishmael and Israel is possible", and supports this view. Non-Moslems must understand that Moslem Fundamentalists interpret the Koran differently from its original significance. He believes that Moslems must understand that their hatred for Israel and the Jews, which occupies such a large portion of their propaganda, is not supported by their religion, Islam.

The Palestinian View
(According to Dr. Khalil Shiqaqi, of the Institute of Palestinian Studies of the Palestinian Authority.)
In order to understand suicide attacks, we must not look at the perpetrators of the attacks but rather at Palestinian society as a whole and how it views suicide attacks. We must examine what causes people to support or oppose suicide attacks. Support or opposition depends on one's political views. Palestinian society has various and varying political views, depending on the period. It supports either the peace process or violence in order to achieve political goals. If it chooses violence, it supports violence against soldiers and sometimes terror against civilians. The question we must address is: What causes these varying views? Why does a society support or oppose terror and suicide attacks?

Palestinian society is Moslem and very traditional. There is an Islamic religious prohibition against suicide. Furthermore, as a traditional society it opposes individualism. Hence from both a religious and a societal perspective we would not expect to see individual suicide attacks and support for them by Palestinians.

However, Palestinian support for terror depends on how they perceive the threat to them from Israel or the Hamas. In other words, what we must examine is the perceived threat. This is an emotional issue. As the perceived threat becomes more intensive, so does support for a more radical policy. The most violent policy a society can support is that of suicide attacks.

Using a more rational approach, the subject depends on a cost-benefit consideration. What happens in Israel after a suicide operation? Does it lead anywhere? Does it increase suffering? Does it create other problems?

He feels that it is the Israelis, because of their behavior, that create the Palestinian feeling of being threatened, leading the Palestinian society to support terror and suicide attacks. Palestinian society must decide whether to support suicide attacks in terms of their consequences, and once again these are cost-benefit considerations. But we must not forget that there are also emotional aspects to the question.

We are fighting against an oppressing regime, mainly against the Israeli Army. Palestinian society sees no difference between the army and the settlers, but does differentiate between the settlers and civilians within Israel (within the "Green Line").

There are four components to the Palestinian feeling of being under grave threat:
1. Threats to Palestinian life, especially as a collective.
2. Threats to their land.
3. Threats to their political values and needs.
4. Economic threats to their standard of living.

The Palestinians hope that suicide attacks will force Israel to withdraw, as it withdrew from Lebanon in 2000. Yet they also fear that these suicide attacks will enable the Israeli political right to gain power, as happened in 1996.

The variables that determine the degree of support for suicide attacks are as follows:
1. Education - the more education, the higher the awareness of the extent of the Israeli threat.
2. Economic and Professional Status - for example if one is a laborer working in Israel the attacks result in closure and the inability to work and make a living.
3. Political affiliation - Hamas supporters will support attacks more than Fatah supporters.
4. Age - If one is young and without family obligations, there is a greater tendency to support terror operations.

Conclusions:
In both cases - that of the Lebanese Shiite and the Palestinian - self-sacrifice activity has been perceived as being a great success. In Lebanon it was seen as being an important ingredient amongst the causes for Israel's withdrawal from most of southern Lebanon in 1985 as well as the unilateral withdrawal from the security strip in 2000. In Israel the terror attacks are seen to have caused panic within Israeli society, as well as the feeling that Islamic terror has become a strategic problem for Israel and may influence major Israeli political decisions.

Yet, with all this, the religious problem remains: Even if these self-sacrifice activities have earned Islamic legal and ideological support,.they still constitute a kind of suicide, even when called self-sacrifice.

In Palestinian society, two motifs have combined: The motif of revolutionary national self-sacrifice ("Fada") and the motif of Islamic self-sacrifice ("Astashada") as a combined element in building their independent "State on the Way". Suicide attacks have attained social legitimacy because they are a way to defend oneself against a terrible enemy and in defense of all that is dear to the society: The religion, the homeland, honor, culture and fundamental values. The words of the Koran: "Do not think of those who have fallen for God as dead. They live and are receiving their compensation from their sovereign Lord... for they are not afraid nor are they sorrowful" have become a slogan and have made self-sacrifice a social ideal, the religious justification of which has disconnected it from the religious prohibition against suicide.

It seems that only once radical Islamic groups execute suicide attacks in Arab states, as part of their struggle against "infidel" secular regimes, that religious leaders and Islamic thinkers will oppose the phenomenon and see it as forbidden suicide. In the meantime, Israel, Zionism, the Jews and Judaism are elements that motivate the suicide attackers, whether they receive Islamic approval or not.

One cannot conclude without mentioning the suicide attacks of Al Queda of Osama Bin Ladin in New York and Washington. His training camps in Afghanistan contained the most up-to-date technology of death and destruction, which he provided to numerous volunteers that came there from every corner of the Moslem world prior to their deadly missions. He has created alliances between diverse groups of Fundamentalist Moslems from around the world. Furthermore, it does appear that some Palestinian suicide terrorists in Israel received their training in Bin Ladin's Afghanistan training camps.

Bibliography:
Andoni, Hamis. "Searching for Answers: Gaza's Suicide Bombers." Journal for Palestine Studies, 26 (4)

Dale, Stephen Fredric. Religious Suicide in Islamic Asia. Ohio, Ohio State University Press, 2000

Institute for Counter-Terrorism. Countering Suicide Terrorism: an International Conference. Herziliya, 2000

Kahan, Claude. Islam: From its Birth until the Beginning of the Ottoman Empire. (Heb) Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1995

Kolberg, Eytan. "Death of the Righteous and Self-Sacrifice in Classic Islam." (Heb) PaMayim, 75, 1998, 5-26

Paz, Reuven. Suicide and Jihad in Radical Palestinian Islam: the Ideological Component. (Heb) Tel Aviv University, Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies

Shapira, Shimon. Hizballah Between Iran and Lebanon. (Heb) Tel Aviv: Kibbutz Ha'Meuchad, 2000.

Yisraeli, Rafi. "Islamikaza - Suicide Terror." (Heb) Nativ

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