|
|
|
Two Wasted Years: Plans and Intrigues,
mid-1958 to mid-1960
|
 |
|
|
In accordance with the experts’ proposal, Klarwein was sent abroad "in order to study similar
buildings".38 After his return from a trip to Europe in the beginning of November 1958, he reported to
the Implementation Committee (Va’adat Habitzuah), which had been set up in June 1958 to actively
follow all the stages of the planning and construction of the Knesset building,39 that "the only thing
worth seeing in Europe was the UNESCO building in Paris”.40 This building constitutes for us an
example of how one can build a parliament in a manner that it was built there, without any luxuries.
There is no marble in sight, everything is simple, natural and beautiful".41
In the meantime the corner stone for the Knesset building was laid on October 14, 1959, in the
presence of James de Rothschild's widow, Dorothy.
Avnery's claim that Klarwein was a man from the establishment, was unfounded. He was, indeed,
employed as an advisor on the government complex project in Jerusalem (see above), and even
participated in the planning of the complex, but he was in fact a loner, who frequently participated in
competitions in the belief that this was the only way for an "outsider" like himself to pave a way for
himself in Israeli architecture.42 A noted establishment man, who was involved in the planning of the
Knesset in the early years, was the engineer Shlomo Gur, one of those who had conceived the
settlement-security concept of "Homma Umigdal" (wall and watch tower) before the establishment of
the state, and had served as project manager in the construction of the Hebrew University campus at
Givat Ram, and the Hadassa Medical Center in Ein Karem, in Jerusalem. Gur, who was a member
of the Knesset Implementation Committee until the middle of 1960, and a dominant figure in it, said in
an interview to journalist Eli Eyal, that "the idea is to start building without plans. All that is needed is
someone with the power to decide, who will take the responsibility upon himself, and start the wheels
moving". Eyal pointed out, that what drove Gur was the desire to live up to deadlines, and that his
work methods raise "astonishment among contractors, and rejection, mixed with anxiety among
architects.43
It seems as though Gur's main intention was to construct the building, while actually doing away
with Klarwein's original plan, despite the experts' positive opinion. When Klarwein returned from his
tour in Europe, he faced an unpleasant surprise. In his absence, the architect Zvi Cohen, who was
brought to the project by Gur , started making far reaching changes in the original plan, without any
prior consultation with Klarwein. In a letter to the Speaker of the Knesset, Kadish Luz, dated
February 11, 1960, Klarwein described the chain of events. He complained that contrary to his
opinion it was decided "to move the main entrance into the building from the North to the South, and
instead of constructing a foreground on the Northern side, to build a terrace, supported by walls, on
the Southern side, which from an architectural point of view would constitute, in fact, an additional
building that would compete with the Knesset building itself.” He added, that while he had been in
Europe, the front of the building had been lengthened from 86 to 120 meters, excavations had
commenced in accordance with the elongated dimensions, and the earth, which had been removed,
was being used to change the incline of the hill on which the building was to be constructed. In
addition, excavations had begun in order to pave an approach road from the direction of Rupin Road
in the South, instead of from the North, as planned.44
 |
|
 |
The plan prepared by Klarwein and Powsner in June 1959. The building is situated at the northern edge of the compound, and the entrance to the building is from the South
|
|
The final plan of the Knesset building, towards the end of the construction |
Professor Yohanan Ratner,45 who had been coopted to the Implementation Committee as an
advisor, explained the chain of events, from his perspective, during one of the Committee's meetings
in May 1959: "We have here a difficult psychological situation. The cause for this psychological
situation… is Klarwein… On the one hand Klarwein received the first prize, and on the other, most of
the architects in the country protested against it. The reasons do not matter. To get rid of him,
means starting a new competition - something nobody wanted… So we started to seek
compromises". One of the ways to get out of the labyrinth, Ratner explained, "was to send Klarwein
abroad. The second way was that even before his trip, Mr. Klarwein agreed to the setting up of an
office which would be headed by the [Tel Aviv architect Shimon] Powsner46 … Klarwein was incapable
of turning his plan into a good building… There Powsner was one of the mediums, who was able to
turn Klarwein's concept into something more reasonable".47
 |
| The model prepared by Klarwein and Powsner in June 1959
|
In March 1959, Klarwein and Powsner presented two separate proposals to the Implementation
Committee. Robertson and Abramowitz, who were asked to express an opinion on the plans, argued
that Powsner's plan, in which much glass was used, was too light, while Klarwein's plan was too
heavy, and that the two ought to be combined.48 On June 22, 1959, the Implementation Committee
received a new plan prepared by Powsner and Klarwein together.49 In the new plan the building lost
its symmetry. The plenary hall, designed as a circle, was moved from the center of the building to its
Eastern side,50 and one of the inner courts was cancelled. The columns on the two sides of the
building were also done away with, in order to limit the dimensions of the building, and the number of
columns at the front and in back, was limited from twenty to fourteen. Despite Klarwein's
reservations, the building was shifted Northwards, and the entrance was left on the South.51
Regarding the change in the location of the building, the Implementation Committee came across
opposition from the Government Complex Committee. In a letter to the Knesset Speaker, Nahum Nir,
Shatner complained on August 6, 1959, that contrary to the agreements of December 22, 1958, the
Implementation Committee was not coordinating its plans with the Government Complex Committee,
and the representatives of the Jerusalem municipality. "The Knesset building is not being
constructed as a single building in an undeveloped site, and its planning must integrate into the
general planning", he wrote. "This does not mean that we wish to deal with all sorts of architectural
issues, but only with the construction plan".52
Regarding the direction of the entrance, a serious debate took place in the Implementation
Committee. The main arguments in favor of the entrance from the North were the fact that those
entering the building would be unable to see the view on the South; the advantage of entering the
building directly, without many steep stairs that a Southern entrance would have necessitate; the
possibility of constructing separate entrances into the building, one for the public and one for the
Knesset Members at different levels; and that the Knesset would thus form an integral part of the
government complex, to its West. The main arguments in favor of the entrance from the South - the
direction preferred by most of the members of the Implementation Committee - was the beautiful view
seen from that direction, the monumentality of the front of the building, as seen by the person
entering the building, because of the differences of height between Rupin Road and the entrance,
and the emphasis on the uniqueness of the Knesset by separating it from the government complex.53
But what finally decided the issue, were the reservations of the IDF to the entrance being on the
South. In a letter written to the Speaker of the Knesset on February 16, 1960, the head of the
Operations Branch in the General Staff, Avharam (Avrasha) Tamir, stated that the entrance from this
side would be dangerous, because "the location chosen for the Knesset building can be observed
from several firing positions across the Jordanian border, at a range of 3,500-4,000 meters, a fact
that theoretically enables the opening of flat trajectory fire - whether by intermediate machine guns
or by tank artillery (direct targeting) - with a fair chance that it would hit its target".54 The fear was
especially of an attack while ceremonies were being held on the foreground of the entrance. Though
Chief of Staff, Haim Laskov, told Kadish Luz that as far as the General Staff was concerned the
entrance could remain on the Southern side, as long as it remained concealed,55 the Implementation
Committee had little choice but to return the entrance to the Northern side.
At around the same time, it was also decided to invite the architect Dov Karmi, winner of the
Israel Prize for Architecture for the year 1957, to act as an advisor and mediator. Karmi was known
as a congenial person, and the members of the Implementation Committee hoped that he would
succeed where Shatner had failed - to rid the project of the bad atmosphere prevailing in it, and pull
it out of the cul-de-sac it appeared to have entered. Karmi's great advantage over all the other
potential candidates for the job, was that he was acceptable to Klarwein, whose suspicion toward all
the other experts, seemed to grow over time.
 |
|
 |
The first model prepared by Karmi and Gillitt in 1960
|
|
The revised model by Karmi and Gillitt in 1961 |
Karmi prepared, together with his son Ram and the young British architect Bill Gillitt, a new plan
that not only returned the building’s entrance to the North, but also moved the building slightly to the
South, turned it from a rectangle to a square, decreased its circumference, and cancelled the
remaining courtyard in its center. Contrary to Klarwein's original plan, the plenary hall was no longer
situated in the middle of the building, because the State Hall was now situated to its West (see
below). At the same time, compared to Powsner's plan, the centrality of the plenary hall in the
building was once again emphasized. At some stage between the middle of 1960 and the middle of
1962 a recess of one story was set in the roof of the building, over the location of the plenary hall,
whose ceiling was designed in the form of a vault. Since the circumference of the building was
reduced significantly, some of the office spaces were moved to a terrace structure on the Southern
inclines of the hill on which the Knesset was built. The logic in this planning was that even if the need
would arise to extend the building, and add rooms and offices to it, the central structure would remain
without change, and the additions would be built around the existing building.56 And indeed, the new
wing, whose construction was completed in 1991, can be seen only in aerial photographs. Whoever
views it from ground level, barely notices this wing. This was also the reason why the central building
was constructed primarily of concrete and stone, and the terraces primarily of glass and stainless
steel.57
At the beginning of March 1960, it became apparent that the entry of the Karmis into the project,
turned Shimon Powsner's continued involvement in it superfluous, and after several months he left,
without even beginning to work on the work plans.58
At the same time, Gur and Ratner made a last effort to prevent the acceptance of Karmi's new
plan, and to bring about the announcement of a new competition. On April 21, 1960, Ratner wrote to
Gur about Karmi's plan:
It is perfectly clear that there is no similarity between this and K's original plan, or ‘the agreed plan’
of 26.6.59 [Powsner and Klarwein's plan}… By means of his agreement to a plan that was not his
own, Klarwein made, in fact, several moves: a) he cancelled the plan that had won the competition;
b) he justified the criticism that had been made against it by his professional peers; c) he destroyed
the basis for all his emotional demands, and the complicated process by which the Implementation
Committee operated, with the intention of preserving his rights and name as the architect of the
building, frequently at the expense of delays, of many difficulties and of financial expenditures; d)
he tried to hand over, for reasons that are not completely clear, and under a legal excuse of
transparency, the planning of the building to another architect. 59
On the same day Gur wrote a letter to the members of the Implementation Committee in which he
wondered how the Implementation Committee should act with regards to Karmi's plan, without
mentioning a new competition.60 But the intrigue didn't succeed. At the meeting held by the
Committee on the new plan in May 1960, general satisfaction was expressed with it, and it was
approved.61 As a result Yohanan Ratner resigned, and shortly thereafter Shlomo Gur resigned as
well.
Ratner and Gur were right when they argued that Dov and Ram Karmi's plan was completely
different from Klarwein's original plan. Years later Ram Karmi said that he and his father did not
relate to Klarwein's plan, or to Powsner's plan when they prepared their proposal, even though he
himself consulted with Ze`ev Rabina, who had worked with Powsner. "The truth is that we felt sorry
for Klarwein. We chopped up his building… So I said to my dad, that even though we had prepared
the new plan, if we wished to create a good atmosphere, so that the plan would go through as
smoothly as possible, we ought to forego mention of our name, and leave Klarwein's name".62 It is
possible that had the issue reached the courts, the Knesset would have been forced to hold a new
competition, but this did not happen.
38 Klarwein had already been sent previously on a "tour of parliaments".
39 Minutes of the 1st meeting of the Implementation Committee, held on June 23, 1958, the Knesset Archive, File 2182, Box 26.
40 The construction of the UNESCO building in Paris, planned by the architects Marcel Breuer, Pier Luigi Nervi and Bernard Zehrfuss, was then in its final stages.
41 Minutes of the 8th meeting of the Implementation Committee, held on November 10, 1958, the Knesset Archive, file 2182, box 26. The UNESCO building is, of course, not a parliament, but a public building, with some features that are relevant for parliaments as well.
42 Among Klarwein's papers we found a note, in which he wrote the following comment in English: "Competitions, I believe, are the only way for a talented architect to learn to earn a reputation and commissions, and yet remain independent of political 'favours' ". Central Zionist Archive, A455/3.
43 Interview held by Eli Eyal with Shlomo Gur, Ha'aretz, March 3, 1960. About people like Gur Klarwein said: "I allways [sic.] deplore the tendency here to minimize the importance of the architect as a professional and to shift the authority and responsibility for construction to a 'building manager'", Central Zionist Archive, A455/3.
44 The Knesset Archive, file 2182 b, box 26.
45 Prof. Yohanan Ratner, had planned the Jewish Agency building in Jerusalem, and was head of the Faculty for Architecture in the Technion in Haifa in the years 1930-63.
46 The secretary of the office, that was located in its early days on the top floor of the Kings Hotel in Jerusalem, was no other than Ora Teib, who was later to marry Mordechai Namir, and eventually became a Member of the Knesset and a Minister in several Governments. At the time that the office was set up Ora returned from a sojourn in New York.
47 Minutes of the 29th meeting of the Implementation Committee, held on May 13, 1959, The Knesset Archive, File 2182, Box 26. It should be noted that Ratner was not a neutral observer, but one of the representatives of the uncompromising modernism in Israeli architecture, who considered Klarwein's work to be regressive, and a disgrace to the developing national ethos. In one of the meetings of the Implementation Committee he referred to Klarwein's original plan as "a box placed in a transparent envelop of columns” (Minutes of the 19th meeting of the Implementation Committee, held on February 24, 1959, Ibid.).
48 Minutes of the 25th meeting of the Implementation Committee, held on April 17, 1959, and Minutes of the 26th meeting, held on May 6, 1959, Ibid.
49 In an interview with the writer on July 5, 1998, Shimon Powsner argued that despite the differences in approach between the two ("I was more modern than him") and the difference in age (Powsner was much younger), he and Klarwein had managed to find common ground on the personal level. "I managed to convince him that I am not acting against him".
50 Very soon the idea of a round hall was given up, and the concept of a hall in the form of a trapeze was adopted. According to Klarwein, the idea of a trapeze was that of the young architects in the office, including Ze`ev Rabina. See, minutes of the 37th meeting of the Implementation Committee, held on November 4, 1959, the Knesset Archive, File 2182, Box 26.
51 Minutes of the 33rd meeting of the Implementation Committee, held on June 22, 1959, Ibid.
52 The State Archive, file 1719a, box C 5448/13.
53 The debate continued over several meetings of the Implementation Committee, but the main discussion on the subject was held on March 10, 1959. See the minutes of the 21st meeting of the Implementation Committee, the Knesset Archive, File 2182, Box 26.
54 The Knesset Archive, file 2182, box 5.
55 Minutes of the 53rd meeting of the Implementation Committee, held on February 29, 1960, the Knesset Archive, file 2182, box 26.
56 Interview held by the writer with Ram Karmi on June 14, 1998.
57 See below.
58 Member of the Knesset Nahum Levin reported to the Implementation Committee a conversation he had had with Powsner, in which the Tel Avivian architect admitted that he found himself in the same situation in which Joseph Klarwein had found himself a year and a half previously: that his plan had been radically changed, without his being consulted. See, minutes of the 51st meeting of the Implementation Committee, held on May 24, 1960, the State Archive, section 60, box 317, file 6.
59 The Knesset Archive, file 3181, box 25.
60 Ibid.
61 Minutes of the 50th meeting of the Implementation Committee, held on May 8, 1960, the State Archive, section 60, box 317, file 6.
62 Interview held by the writer with Ram Karmi on June 14, 1998.
Continued...
© Copyright 2006, The State of Israel. All Rights Reserved.
We welcome your Suggestions and Comments.
Email: feedback@knesset.gov.il
|
|
|
